A 4 year engagement rebuilding a legacy loan origination system into a configurable platform — serving 500+ internal users across 4 departments and thousands of MSME borrowers across India. It is about a system that was failing the people inside it — and a research process that revealed why fixing the interface would not fix the system. It covers 4 years of work, one genuine reframe, five archetypes who lived inside the failure, and the decisions that shaped what was built — and what wasn't.
I had worked on the legacy LOS for nearly a year before this project started. Enough time to observe its failures directly — not from a brief, but from being inside it. When the merger created conditions for a new platform, that firsthand knowledge became the starting hypothesis. Research didn't create the problem list. It validated, deepened, and in several cases overturned it. The approach combined Non-Linear Design Thinking with Systems Thinking — looping between empathy, ideation, prototyping, and testing as findings demanded. What drove it was curiosity: every answer raised a new question, and following those questions back and forth between departments revealed how each team's behaviour was shaped by — and in turn shaped — every other.



The findings gave us named, principle-grounded evidence to anchor every design system decision.






It was the last working day of the month. The customer had agreed — 21% interest, 2-year tenure — but only if funds arrived before Friday(Last Working Day of the month) evening. Three customers, same commitment, each 50km apart. The RM needed physical signatures from all of them before cutoff. At the third stop, the customer caught it himself: the name on the application didn't match his ID. One field, wrong from the start. The case went back. The entire cycle restarted — Credit, Sanction, Operations. The RM drove back, got the corrected signature, walked in at 1:30pm. The disbursal didn't make Friday. Four checkpoints. Not one caught it. This happened every month in some form — because the system had no validation at entry, no cross-field checks, and no way to surface an error before it became a physical journey.






Pre-disbursal form verification with auto-population. The existing process required manual form fill, physical signature, scan, upload, and Ops head verification. End-to-end: 5–6 hours. 28% of cases were being processed repetitively due to upstream errors the system made invisible.
" A digitally signed incorrect application is a faster failure — not a better experience. Fix accuracy first. Then accelerate."
E-sign was the most visible signal of a digital-first platform — commercially rational for B2B SaaS investors and customers alike. Management's case was strong. We didn't dismiss it.
" E-sign was sequenced as Q+1 priority #1 — not killed. When it shipped, it landed on a process that actually worked. The digital-first signal management wanted arrived on a stable foundation."
220 applications over 6 months through the referral programme. 2 met eligibility criteria — and both were rejected.
Conversion rate: 0%.
The informal referral network already existed — 80% of MSME borrowers came through word of mouth anyway.
The feature formalised a behaviour that was already happening, added engineering overhead, and produced nothing.
EMI payment via Bharat Setu was retained — an effective fallback when E-NACH failed due to bank defaults.
What was removed: utility payments (electricity, gas, bills) added as a delight feature.
Fewer than 10 customers from 3,000+ ever used it.
A lending app is not a bills app. Removed to simplify and cut maintenance overhead.
Real-time leaderboards — top 5 PAN India per department, updated live. If employees were already talking about who was top, the platform should make that visible, real-time, and earned.
Volume-only rankings would reward Ravi for closing cases fast — even if Deepa absorbed the errors downstream.
The fix: the Executive Dashboard surfaces average TAT per employee alongside disbursal volume. Speed is visible. So is the cost of cutting corners. The leaderboard drives the behaviour. The dashboard holds it accountable.
The mobile app, real-time leaderboard, deferral marking digitisation, and deviation workflow automation were not on the original brief. All four came directly from field research and co-design sessions. The users who needed them most had never been asked — and wouldn't have known to ask.
The reframe that changed the brief — and how it was won — is documented in full in the Reframe section. The principle it demonstrated applies to every significant push-back in this project: come with the data that makes the cost of inaction visible. Not the UX cost. The cost to revenue, to targets, and to the people whose incentives are at stake.
The most impactful leadership move wasn't a design decision — it was structural. Research findings weren't presented to department heads — they were given to them to use before their quarterly meetings. Journey maps, ticket patterns, and field observations became the evidence they used to argue for investment, process changes, and policy decisions. One example: the National Credit Head used CM journey mapping data to make the case for a new pre-assessment process to the CEO — without the design team in the room. Design stopped being the team that executes after decisions are made. It became the team whose evidence made decisions possible.
01. Standardized research templates for ethnography, card sorting, tree sorting, and presentations - sessions could run without me
02. Broke department silos — replaced requirements documentation with joint ideation sessions where teams co-owned what was being built
03. Built design system with documented usage principles — component decisions not reinvented every sprint
04. A co-creation format the team could facilitate independently
01. Giving ownership before someone feels fully ready — and trusting the scaffolding to hold them
02. Shifting from doing the work to creating conditions for the work to be done well
03. Knowing when to step back — the hardest part of leading a small team
Pre DLP - 3.2 tickets per application across 1,290 applications over 6 months
Post DLP - Last Quarter - 129 tickets across 311 cases processed = 0.74 tickets per case
Half-yearly evaluation across 100 respondents — internal employees (CMs, RMs, Ops, Support) and external lending partners.
Method: structured questionnaire administered at the end of each 6-month performance cycle, covering system usability, task completion confidence, and overall experience.
Team of 4 handling three request categories: DLP support tickets, platform configuration requests, and customer queries.
10 hours calculated at ~4.5 min average reduction per ticket (15% of ~30 min average resolution time) across 129 tickets. Per-task efficiency — not volume increase.
The platform still requires humans at multiple points — hygiene checks, credit assessment, deviation approvals, sanction sign-offs. Which of those genuinely require human judgement, and which are manual only because the system hasn't been built to handle them? If most can be automated, the platform could serve a significantly larger loan book without increasing headcount. That's a systems design problem — and where the next version should start.